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Preface 
This is a revised version of a paper presented at the UNI-Rokkan seminar in Paris 18–
20 March 2010 and the 2010 IRSPM Conference held in Bern, Switzerland 7–9. April. 
Panel on: Working Across Boundaries: Barriers, Enablers, Tensions and Puzzles. We 
wish to thank the participants on these events for useful suggestions and comments.
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Sammendrag 
I dette notatet rettes oppmerksomheten mot samarbeid på tvers av organisasjonsgrenser 
i norsk setralforvaltning. Følgende tre problemstillinger diskuteres: a) hvor utbredt er 
bruken av arbeidsgrupper og prosjektgrupper internt i deptartementene, mellom 
departement og mellom departement og underliggende enheter; b) hvilke endringar har 
skjedd over tid i bruken av slike kollegiale organ; c) i hvilken grad varierer deltakelsen i 
slike aktiviteter med individuelle og organisatoriske kjennetegn; d) i hvilken grad 
påvirker deltakelse i slike tverrgående grupper de ansattes holdninger til samordning. Et 
strukturelt-instrumentelt og et demografisk perspektiv benyttes for å forklare variasjoner 
i deltakelse i kollegiale organer og effekten av slik deltakelse. Det benyttes en flernivå-
anlyse for å undersøke effekter både av individuelle trekk og av organisatoriske 
kjennetegn ved departementene.
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Summary 
In this paper we address the problems of working across boundaries in central 
government by focusing on the case of Norway. The main research questions are: a) 
How common is the use of working or project groups inside the ministries, across 
ministries, and between ministries and central agencies? b) What changes have there 
been over time in the use of such cross-border collegial bodies? c) To what extent does 
participation in cross-boundary activities vary according to individual and organizational 
features? d) What is the relationship between participation in working and project 
groups and attitudes towards coordination? The main theoretical approach to explain 
variation in collegial participation and its effects will be a structural/instrumental 
perspective and a demographic perspective. We apply a multi-level analysis examining 
the effects of both individual features and organizational features of the ministries as a 
whole.
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Introduction 
The concept of working across boundaries is becoming increasingly important in public 
administration and in management theory and practice. It is a reflection of the 
increasing complexity and fragmentation that New Public Management (NPM) reforms 
have brought, which strain political and administrative leaders’ capacity to solve societal 
problems (Christensen and Lægreid 2007a). As a result there is currently an enhanced 
focus on the notion of increased coordination. Such efforts are typically referred to as 
joined-up government, whole-of-government, holistic government, collaborative 
governance, networked government, connected government, cross-cutting policy, 
horizontal management, partnerships and collaborative public management (Gregory 
2003). A common feature is the notion that working across organizational boundaries 
will enable more efficient and/or effective policy development and implementation and 
service delivery. Such modes of operating are supposed to counter 
«departmentalization» and existing fragmented modes of working; however, while they 
promise much, there is actually a number of challenges associated with using them in 
practice. Like NPM, post-NPM efforts aim to find «one size to fit all», which is rather 
unrealistic. 
In post-NPM reform efforts both vertical and horizontal coordination problems 
have received a renewed focus (Christensen and Lægreid, 2006, 2007b). In the vertical 
dimension, channelling more central resources towards subordinate institutions and 
levels and using stronger instruments of central control have become increasingly 
important ways for political executives to regain political control and pursue consistent 
policies across levels. In the horizontal dimension, cross-sectoral bodies, programs or 
projects are increasingly being used to modify the «siloization» or «pillarization» of the 
central public administration (Pollitt 2003).  
In this paper we will address the problems of working across boundaries in central 
government by focusing on the case of Norway. The main research questions are: 
a) How common is the use of working or project groups across ministerial 
departments (the internal horizontal dimension), across ministries (the 
horizontal inter-organizational dimension) and between ministries and 
central agencies (the vertical inter-organizational dimension)? 
b) What changes have there been over time in the use of such cross-
boundary, collegial working and project groups? 
c) To what extent does participation in such collegial bodies vary according 
to individual and organizational features? 
d) What is the relationship between participation in working and project 
groups and attitudes towards coordination? 
The main theoretical approach to explain variation in collegial participation and its 
effects will be a structural/instrumental perspective and a demographic perspective, 
looking into the importance of structural features and personnel characteristics, 
respectively (Christensen and Lægreid 2007a). We will apply a multi-level analysis 
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examining the effect of both individual features and organizational features of ministries 
as civil servants’ working environment. The main explanatory variables at the individual 
levels are structural features such as position and main tasks, and demographic features 
such as gender, education and tenure. At the organizational level the structural variables 
include organizational size and demographic variables such as tenure. The main 
dependent variables are 1) civil servants’ participation in different boundary-spanning 
working groups, task forces and project groups within their own ministry, between 
ministries and between their own ministry and subordinate agencies; and 2) their 
assessment of horizontal and vertical coordination.1 
Figure 1. Model of analysis 
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Given a small N at organizational level, we only consider a small set of explanatory 
variables at that level. More specifically, we will focus on the impact of size and 
institutional experience. The main empirical basis of the analysis is a survey of 
Norwegian ministries conducted in 2006 and answered by a total of 1,846 civil servants. 
We will also use similar surveys from 1996, 1986 and 1976. 
Theoretical approaches to boundary-spanning and 
coordination 
While previous Norwegian research has been concerned with civil servants’ perceptions 
of coordination (Christensen and Lægreid 2008a), this paper also explores variation in 
actual participation in both vertical and horizontal collegial bodies across all eighteen 
ministries. So far research has focused on how individual resources affect the attitudes 
and behaviour of civil servants. The role played by aggregate organizational features has 
received less attention in the literature, even though civil servants’ behaviour is likely to 
be influenced not only by who they are and what opinions they hold, but also where 
they work. Hence, hypotheses about how civil servants perform should be tested not 
only against individual-level data, but also against aggregate cross-ministerial data. 
The basic assumption in organizational theory is that people are influenced by the 
organization to which they belong as well as by their individual socio-economic or 
career features. We are looking not only at «individuals in organizations» but also at 
                                                 
1 Concerning the assessment or perception of coordination, the three collegial participatory variables are used as 
independent variables, in line with research question d). 
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«organizations of individuals». The challenge is to examine the interplay between 
individual characteristics and organizational features to understand how civil servants 
behave and act (Lægreid and Olsen 1978). The early socialization and experiences 
related to gender, age and education that employees bring with them into the ministries 
make a difference, as does tenure as reflection of career experience in the civil service. 
The organizational factors are of two types: individual structural ones related to formal 
position and tasks; and relational or aggregate ones related to size and tenure profile. 
Indeed, it would make little sense to deny the importance of dependency and 
interdependency between people who work together. The idea is that individuals go 
through learning processes both outside and inside the civil service and are socialized by 
the norms, attitudes and behaviour they encounter in the contexts in which they operate 
(Eriksson 2007:57); these norms and attitudes, in turn, are modified and shaped by 
individual structural and collective organizational variables. The individual and 
organizational variables will be derived from an instrumental and a demographic 
perspective. 
An  i n s t r umen ta l - s t r u c t u r a l  p e r spe c t i v e .  
According to an instrumental-structural perspective, decision-making processes in public 
organizations are characterized by political-administrative leaders controlling the 
activities of participants in the processes and scoring rather high on rational calculation 
or clear means-end thinking (Dahl and Lindblom 1953, Egeberg 2003). The influence of 
leaders over such processes involves both utilizing, in a bounded rational way, the 
frames and leeway a formal public structure provides, and influencing this structural 
context by controlling change, reorganizations or reform processes (Christensen et al. 
2007). So the basic message is that «formal structure matters» and that leaders’ design 
and rational use of the structural context channels decision-making behaviour. This 
perspective has two versions, according to which decision-making can either be the 
result of strong hierarchical steering or of negotiations among top political and 
administrative leaders (March and Olsen 1983). 
We also have a multi-level governance system in which tasks are carried out at 
different levels of government, implying increased interdependence of public agencies 
operating at different territorial levels, often in a complex system of overlapping 
jurisdictions (Marks and Hooghe 2004, Bache and Flinders 2004). Tasks can rarely be 
treated independently of each other: different levels have to collaborate, and 
coordination between levels is as important as coordination between sectors. There are 
several approaches to analyzing coordination in such a multi-level system with 
overlapping principles of specialization (Lægreid and Serigstad 2006). One is the 
hierarchical view that assumes that work is divided by sector (Gulick 1937), often used 
synonymously with purpose or tasks, which makes them vertical in nature and 
characterized by strong sectors and weak horizontal coordinating mechanisms (Kettl 
2003). This implies that vertical coordination within specific sectors may be good. 
Coordination is achieved by the use of hierarchy, legal authority and specialization of 
tasks and is a vertical internal process with clear lines of authority. Its strengths are 
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related to vertical accountability, role specifications and handling of routine tasks. This 
is a top-down approach based on the hierarchical model. 
The idea of top-down coordination is derived from the notion that the organizations 
to be coordinated have already been identified by headquarters coordinators, that the 
relationship of these organizations to each other is well understood, that agreement has 
been reached about what objectives will be accomplished by altering certain of these 
inter-organizational relationships, and that the authority and means to alter these 
relationships exist. In other words, it assumes that having a hierarchy will facilitate 
implementation. The problem is that several of these assumptions are only partly 
fulfilled, and the problems of coordination do not always lend themselves well to 
hierarchical direction (Wise 2002:141). The tasks of the modern state, however, 
represent a complex and fragmented area of government, and a growing number of 
complex cases and problems do not fit into this traditional sectoral structure. In 
political-administrative structures solving such problems is a challenge, mainly because it 
implies horizontal coordination between different sectors. 
Luther Gulick (1937) stressed the two important structural dimensions of 
specialization and coordination in public organizations, but also their dynamic 
relationship: the more specialization in a public organization, the more pressure for 
increased coordination, or vice versa. His two types of basic specialization are the 
vertical and horizontal ones. Vertical specialization says something about the number of 
hierarchical or leadership levels and how formal authority is divided between them. His 
four types of horizontal structural specialization are specialization by purpose, process, 
clientele or geography. 
The challenges of coordination by organization also depend qualitatively on whether 
the structural specialization is based on either of these principles. If a public 
administration is based on the principle of purpose, the main coordinative challenge 
would be to get different sectoral administrations to work together on cross-sectoral 
problems; if process is the basic principle, on the other hand, getting different 
professions and experts to join forces would be a challenge. Specialization based on 
client groups requires coordinative efforts aimed at equal treatment of different groups, 
while geographic specialization requires spatial standardization. 
Gulick’s two main types of formal coordination are through hierarchy and collegial 
organization – i.e. when the participants are basically at the same hierarchical level – and 
both of these forms are relevant in our analysis. The potential for coordination, both 
horizontal and especially vertical, is largest in a hierarchically dominant leadership, while 
collegial coordination is more of a control issue and often brings a greater variety of 
solutions because of consultation and consensus-building. The three types of 
participation in the working and project groups on which we focus would probably 
engender different challenges and forms of coordination. Working and project group 
participation inside a ministry pose fewer coordination challenges, both horizontal and 
vertical, than between ministries, where more hierarchies and leaders are involved; while 
the challenges of coordinating between ministries and subordinate agencies are probably 
somewhere in between in terms of the challenges involved. 
A supplementary take on collegial groups within the structural perspective would be 
to focus on network theory. Networks have recently been introduced in most western 
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democracies as a way to increase the capacity of the public sector to deliver services. 
Governance networks can be seen as part of a process of transition from a hierarchical 
state government to a network form consisting of decentralized nodes of authority, but 
it can also be seen as a tool that powerful governmental actors use to increase their 
capacity to shape and deliver public policy in a complex world (Klijn and Skelcher 2007, 
598). This last conjecture challenges the «governance without government» thesis of 
Rhodes (1996) that networks are self-organizing, that the government is only one of 
many players and that there is a strong horizontal component in the networks (Bache 
2000). In contrast this instrumental conjecture implies that the central government is a 
powerful actor that creates networks in order to realize its projects (Skelcher et al. 2005). 
For complex, unstructured and rapidly changing problems a network approach may 
be more suitable (Kettl 2003, Wise 2002). This approach understands coordination as 
the interaction between interdependent actors from different, traditionally hierarchical 
structures and from outside such structures. They pay less heed to formal top-down 
authority and rely more on negotiations and mutual adjustments and on bringing 
together organizations to pool resources and knowledge. This network model scores 
high on adaptability and flexibility, but accountability may be reduced and ambiguous, 
and steering may be more difficult. A third model, which can be labelled the hybrid 
model, combines the hierarchical and the network models. This hybrid model gives 
statutory power to the central ministry and some coordinating responsibility to collegial 
arrangements. We will claim that networks as a coordinating mechanism supplement the 
traditional hierarchy rather than replacing it (Verhoest, Bouckart and Peters 2007). 
A main concern that arises when networks are used within the public sector is the 
problem of accountability. In a hierarchical model the concept of accountability is 
primarily related to upward accountability to political sovereigns (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2002). The network model will make a model of strictly hierarchical 
responsibility from the top less applicable. Collegial arrangements need some level of 
independence but at the same time should be accountable to their own home ministry, 
upwards to politicians, horizontally to other ministries and downwards to subordinate 
bodies. 
The governance literature in general is in large part concerned with networks as a 
phenomenon in which private actors are a central feature (Rhodes 1996, Skelcher et al. 
2005). But there is also a more state-centric approach to governance (Peters and Pierre 
2003) in which a public-public network is a main component. In our case the network is 
explicitly public-public, but such networks also have to handle the problems of many 
hands (Thompson 1980) and situations in which hierarchical accountability is challenged 
by accountability to local actors as well as to different professional actors. 
Networking and boundary-spanning competences imply having civil servants as go-
betweens and brokers who have the ability to work across organizational boundaries 
both vertically and horizontally (Christensen and Lægreid 2008b). It is connected to 
governance approaches and post-NPM reforms and is about the ability to bring together 
civil servants from different policy areas and to trump hierarchy (Hood and Lodge 2006, 
92). Here civil servants act as facilitators, negotiators and diplomats rather than 
exercising hierarchical authority. Individual, people-oriented skills, rather than technical 
skills, are central to this kind of competence, and may be especially important when 
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facing «wicked issues» that transcend traditional sectors and policy areas. The ability to 
further cooperation is also valued. 
Empirical expectations. What kind of expectations might be formulated based on the 
structurally oriented theories discussed above? First, concerning the structural variables 
on the individual level, we would expect leaders to have a greater obligation to organize 
and further coordination, and also to see coordination differently to executive officers 
lower down in the hierarchy. This results in a general expectation that leaders will score 
highest on their participation in a broad range of coordination forms, especially along 
the external dimension. This perspective also offers insights into variations in how 
network participation varies between different policy areas and among officials 
performing different tasks, because these formal features determine how internally or 
externally directed their work is, how technical or non-technical the tasks are, the 
number and type of stakeholders, etc. Civil servants working with more general tasks, 
like coordination, policy development, planning, regulation, law-preparing activities, etc., 
would probably participate more in collegial groups than employees engaged in 
narrower functions. 
Concerning the structural organizational variables the size of the ministries might make 
a difference. On the one hand, we would expect small ministries to involve a larger 
proportion of their civil servants in external boundary-spanning activities than bigger 
ministries. On the other hand, one might expect bigger ministries to have a greater need 
for internal boundary-spanning activities than smaller, because of complexity. 
Regarding the effects on perceived coordination the main empirical expectation from 
the structural-instrumental perspective is that civil servants participating in inter-
ministrial collegial bodies will have a more positive assessment of horizontal 
coordination. Likewise, civil servants participating in collegial bodies with subordinate 
agencies will have a more positive assessment of vertical coordination within their own 
policy area. But other structural features may make a difference as well. Those holding 
leadership positions, for instance, are likely to have a more positive assessment of 
vertical and horizontal coordination overall (Christensen and Lægreid 2008a). One 
might also expect main tasks to make a difference, meaning that civil servants having 
coordination, planning and development as main tasks would tend to have a more 
positive view of coordination than those with other tasks. 
Regarding the organizational variables, we would have mixed expectations 
concerning ministry size, meaning that belonging to large ministries might engender 
more positive attitudes towards inter-ministerial coordination, while belonging to small 
ministries might foster a more positive attitude towards inter-ministerial coordination.  
A  demog raph i c  pe r spe c t i v e  
The second theoretical perspective used is a demographic perspective, which has elements 
both from an instrumental-structural approach, concerning conscious recruitment and 
career organization, but also from a cultural perspective, related to the development of 
administrative and professional cultures (Christensen et al. 2007). Demography may also 
explain variety in boundary-spanning participation. The focus will be more on where 
civil servants come from and what they bring with them into ministries and central 
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agencies in the way of norms, values and competence – as well as what they experience 
during their careers there – than where they are located in the organizational structure. 
The general reasoning here is that civil servants, through their socio-economic 
background or their individual careers. have acquired certain norms and values that are 
relevant in their jobs (Lægreid and Olsen 1978, Meier 1973, Pfeffer 1983). 
Individual demographic variables are of different kinds. Gender and type of higher 
education focus on early socialization and how the «baggage» of norms and values they 
bring with them into the civil service becomes relevant when they start their careers and 
in their subsequent career paths. One would expect rather clear effects on decision-
making behaviour if these features are important for the identities and thought models 
of civil servants; one would also expect there to be factors inside the civil service that 
might also strengthen the importance of these. Higher education also means that people 
might be presocialized into their jobs in the civil service, i.e. their education has 
prepared them well for what awaits them. Moreover, some professions, such as jurists, 
probably have a more distinctive professional culture, heightening the effects of this 
mechanism.  
Tenure is rather different to individual demographic variables, for age is also an 
indicator of belonging to a particular generation (Christensen and Lægreid 2009). People 
are born into a certain phase of history, distinguished by a certain economic, political, 
social and technological context, meaning that different generations of bureaucrats hold 
different sets of attitudes (Orren and Skowronek 1994, Pierson 2004). The theory is that 
they are «stuck in their generation», meaning that they are later heavily influenced by 
«path-dependency» – i.e. their norms and values are characterized by their formative 
years – or to put it another way, roots influence routes (Krasner 1988, Selznick 1957). 
One potentially problematic feature of this reasoning is how we are to judge how this 
influences their attitudes as civil servants later on. Tenure deals with the cumulative 
careers of civil servants (Christensen and Lægreid 2009) and thus encompasses a 
number of different stages – from initial career with socialization into basic political-
administrative norms to mid-career when civil servants become more «mature» and 
acquire middle-level management positions, and finally the latter part of their career as 
top leaders or specialized, experienced advisors, who have gained a lot of experience 
and contacts. Just like the institutions themselves, one would expect civil servants to 
develop more and more complex models of thought and action as a result of their 
diverse layers of experience and contacts. 
Demographic variables on an organizational level, i.e. cumulative or relational factors, 
may be important for the thoughts and actions of civil servants (Pfeffer 1983). One very 
general line of reasoning would be that more general aggregative features may both have 
an influence per se, and have a dynamic relationship with individual demographic 
features and structural factors. Having a ministry dominated by a cohort of very 
experienced civil servants may produce different norms and decisions than one 
dominated by a less experienced cohort or with a more even tenure distribution. 
Empirical expectations: The more specific questions in this paper would be whether 
we can expect variation in boundary-spanning activities – participation in working and 
project groups – based on individual and organizational or aggregative demographic 
features. Concerning individual demographic variables, one general expectation would be that 
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women would be less involved in boundary-spanning activities, based on an expectation 
that women in organizational settings lack access to emergent interaction networks 
(O’Leary and Ickovics 1992). Concerning higher educational background, one would 
expect political scientists and economists to be more involved in working and project 
groups, a reflection of different types of education, while jurists would tend to handle 
«narrow» individual cases. Further, civil servants with long tenure would be expected to 
participate more in boundary-spanning activities, because their experience and contacts 
would give them the wherewithal to do so. 
Concerning the aggregative demographic variables used, one would expect ministries with 
a large share of civil servants with more than five years of tenure to use boundary-
spanning activities more extensively than ministries with generally less experienced civil 
servants, because the greater number of contacts associated with longer individual 
tenure would be reflected in a broader collective contact pattern. 
Regarding the effects on perceived vertical and horizontal coordination our 
expectation is that people with long tenure would report more positive effects, that 
social scientists and economists would make more positive assessments than jurists, and 
that women would report less positive experiences with coordination than men. 
Concerning the aggregative variables, one would expect ministries with a large share of 
civil servants with a long tenure generally to have a more positive attitude towards 
coordination. 
The reform context  
NPM  and  po s t -NPM  
NPM was a mixed bag of different reform measures (Hood 1991, Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2004). The basic idea was to promote more efficient government, and the instruments 
expect to further this were intended to bring about strong vertical (devolution) and 
horizontal («role purity») specialization. NPM proved to be relatively good at putting the 
emphasis on efficiency, but at the same time fragmented the capacity of government to 
address «wicked problems» (Aucoin 2002). 
The first generation of NPM reforms worked against an integrated approach by 
limiting the capacity for horizontal coordination and collaboration, especially at the 
central level (Kavanagh and Richards 2001, Weller et al. 1997). The fact that each 
individual state body was regarded as an autonomous organization contributed to this 
(Brunsson and Sahlin-Anderson 2000). The process of increased autonomy created new 
challenges for coordination since this normally takes place between administrative 
executives at different levels. 
The central government apparatus increasingly experienced problems of inter-
sectoral and inter-ministerial coordination as a result of NPM reforms. Executives tend 
to focus on their own sectors and organizations, thus contributing to horizontal 
fragmentation between policy areas. Many western countries are dominated by strongly 
specialized ministries, and administrative reforms are propelled within individual sectors 
by strong line ministers. In a period when problems increasingly traverse ministerial 
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boundaries, this has contributed to problems of horizontal coordination and has 
triggered the need for post-NPM initiatives. 
The main goal of post-NPM reforms has been to gradually move public-sector 
organizations back from the disintegration or fragmentation brought about under NPM 
to a situation of greater integration and coordination (Christensen and Lægreid 2007a). 
First, fragmentation under NPM increased pressure for more horizontal integration and 
coordination. Second, political executives have been reluctant to accept the undermining 
of political control that NPM has brought about. This has resulted in efforts to 
strengthen central capacity and control, particularly in sectors seen as politically salient 
(Gregory 2003, Halligan 2006 and 2007). There is an increasing striving for coordination 
and coherence in public policy, and one answer seems to be a return to the centre 
(Peters 2005). Third, confronted with an increasingly insecure world, whether the result 
of terrorism, bio-security concerns, tsunamis, pandemics, global financial or 
environmental crises, national states are seeking to strengthen central political control, 
but also seeing an increasing need for contingent coordination and network approaches 
(Christensen and Painter 2004, Kettl 2003, Wise 2002). 
The second generation of reforms advocated a more holistic strategy (Bogdanor 
2005). The slogans «joined-up-government» (JUG) and «whole-of-government» (WG) 
provided new labels for the old doctrine of coordination in the study of public 
administration (Hood 2005). In addition to the issue of coordination, the problem of 
integration was a main concern behind these reform initiatives (Mulgan 2005). The 
purpose was to work across portfolio boundaries and administrative levels to achieve a 
shared goal and an integrated government response to particularly complex issues. 
Attempts to coordinate government policy-making and service delivery across 
organizational boundaries are, however, not a new phenomenon (Ling 2002, Kavanagh 
and Richards 2001). The scope of whole-of-government is pretty broad. In this paper 
we focus on joining up at the top and we distinguish between horizontal linkages and vertical 
linkages. 
The Norwegian context 
Norway has a large public sector and there is a relatively high level of mutual trust 
between central actors and public-sector organizations (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). 
It is a unitary state with a combination of political and administrative decentralization. 
The central government in Norway is characterized by strong sectoral ministries and 
relatively weak super-ministries with coordination responsibilities across ministerial 
areas. The principle of ministerial responsibility is strong, meaning that the individual 
minister is responsible for all activities in his or her portfolio and in subordinate 
agencies and bodies. The only ministry with strong horizontal coordination power is the 
Ministry of Finance, but this power is mainly restricted to questions of budget and 
financial resources and not to more substantial policy issues. The Prime Minister’s 
Office has traditionally been rather small and it has not been a strong coordination 
body, but it has become more important over the past decade. That said, some 
ministries, such as the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Justice and the 
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Police, the Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs, the 
Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, do have some coordination tasks across ministerial areas.  
The central government apparatus is generally characterized by strong hierarchy and 
strong specialization according to tasks, but these Weberian organizational forms have 
been supplemented by a variety of other features, changing the internal organization of 
the central public administration, such as introducing internal team work, or collegial 
network-based working or project groups working across hierarchical levels and sectoral 
boundaries, the focus of our analysis. 
The Norwegian government has a decentralized tradition when it comes to personnel 
management. Responsibility for recruitment is delegated to the individual ministry and 
agency, and recruitment is based on merit and professional background. There is no 
civil service college, no senior executive service or senior civil service, and no central 
recruitment unit, something that potentially may create a lot of diversity concerning 
cultural norms and values, but societal homogeneity has been reflected in cultural 
homogeneity in the civil service. 
Norway was a reluctant reformer and came late to NPM reforms (Olsen 1996), but 
over the past decade two development features in the Norwegian central government 
have affected the coordination pattern. First, the NPM reforms have increased vertical 
and horizontal specialization, while at the same time trying to balance this with a focus 
on vertical coordination, mainly within the government apparatus but also between 
central and local government. Management-by-objectives-and-results has mainly 
addressed how superior authorities can control their subordinate agencies and bodies via 
various forms of performance-management techniques and quasi-contractual 
arrangements. This is also linked to structural devolution efforts that have turned some 
more public administration bodies into state-owned companies and given central 
agencies enhanced autonomy, not to mention the increase in regulatory agencies with 
more leeway. The problems of horizontal coordination have not been addressed to the 
same extent, but this does not mean that this is not an important problem in the 
Norwegian political-administrative system. Typical post-NPM reform features in 
Norway over the last decade have been reflected in a police reform, which merged 
police districts, a hospital reform, strengthening control of central government, several 
efforts to control the immigration agencies, and – most typical of all – in a major 
welfare administration reform merging two agencies at the central level – the 
employment and national insurance administrations – and establishing a local 
partnership with social services based in the municipalities. 
Data sources and method 
The analysis draws on two types of data sets. The first is a comprehensive survey among 
civil servants with at least one year of tenure in all eighteen ministries. The survey was 
conducted in 2006, and included 1,846 respondents, ranging from 9 at the Prime 
Minister’s Office to 284 in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see Christensen and Lægreid 
2008a, 2008b, 2009). The response rate was 67 percent. The survey contains 
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information about individual demographic and structural variables and participation 
patterns, including participation in work and project groups and attitudes on a wide 
range of issues. 
In order to examine how ministry-level variables affect participation in coordination 
initiatives, the data from the civil servant survey were linked to data on ministry 
characteristics. The latter include information about the size of each ministry, measured 
as the number of employees, and ‘collective experience’ measured as the share of 
employees who have been in the same institution for more than five years. All 
independent variables included for analysis together with their definitions are shown in 
Table 1. 
Table 1: Independent variables and definitions 
Variable  Definition 
Civil servant-Level 
Gender Dummy=1 for male candidates, 0 for female 
Tenure Dummy=1 less than 5 years tenure, 0 five years or more 
Leadership position Dummy=1 assistant director general and above, 0 other position 
Jurists  Dummy=1 jurist, 0 other professional background 
Social scientists Dummy=1 social scientist, 0 other professional background 
Economists Dummy=1 economist, 0 other professional background 
Coordination Dummy=1 coordination as main task, 0 other main task 
Planning and development Dummy=1 for planning and development as main task, 0 other main task 
Ministry – level 
Ministry size The number of employees in each ministry 
Ministry tenure  Percentage employed for more than 5 years in each ministry 
The analysis distinguishes between three types of boundary-spanning activities. These 
three dependent variables are measured from a single survey question, which asked civil 
servants whether they had participated in various types of work-group/projects during 
the last twelve months (they were required to answer «yes» or «no»). The first variable 
deals with participation in project groups within ministries. The second variable deals 
with vertical coordination, and here the respondent was asked to identify participation 
in projects or groups with participants from the sub-ministry level. The last variable 
maps participation in work and project groups between ministries (participants from 
several ministries). This variable was intended as a rough indicator of horizontal 
coordination initiatives. For all three variables those who participated are coded 1, those 
who did not are coded 0. 
In the survey we asked civil servants the following question about their assessment of 
coordination along different dimensions: ‘How would you characterise coordination in 
your field of work along the following dimensions? a) coordination between different 
subordinate state bodies and agencies within your own ministerial area, and b) 
coordination with state units in other sectors’. The answers to these two questions serve 
as the basis for the two dependent variables in the analysis regarding the effects of 
boundary-spanning activities on coordination, i.e. research question d. These dependent 
variables, attitudes to vertical coordination and attitudes to inter-ministerial 
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coordination, ranged from one («very good») to six («very bad»). Vertical coordination attitudes 
had a mean of 2.26 and a standard deviation of 0.77, while the corresponding figures for 
inter-sectoral coordination attitudes were 2.62 and 0.75. There was not much variation 
on the two dependent variables, and they were both heavily skewed towards positive 
attitudes. The civil servants turned out to be generally positive towards both types of 
coordination, with 67 percent finding vertical coordination within their own policy area 
good or very good, 28 percent reporting mixed experiences, and 5 percent finding it bad 
or very bad. Their assessment of horizontal coordination between different policy areas 
or sectors was less enthusiastic. Only 44 percent found this kind of coordination good 
or very good, 47 percent had had mixed experiences, while 9 percent reported that it 
was bad or very bad. 
Descriptive statistics for all the explanatory variables are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics. Independent variables. 
Civil servant-level descriptive statistics 
Variable  N Mean  SD Minimum Maximum 
Leadership position 1531 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Tenure 1531 0.32 0.46 0 1 
Gender 1531 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Jurists 1531 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Political scientists  1531 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Economists 1531 0.17 0.48 0 1 
Coordination 1531 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Planning and development 1531 0.30 0.49 0 1 
      
Ministry-level descriptive statistics 
Variable  N Mean  SD Minimum Maximum 
Ministry size 18 228.06 155.69 60 768 
Ministry tenure 18 69.34 8.17 43.40 78.90 
The scope and trajectories of boundary-spanning 
activities 
Table 3 shows, first, that boundary-spanning activities involving participating in inter-
organizational working groups in the Norwegian central government is high. The scope 
of such activity is significant. The hierarchy is to a great extent supplemented by such 
collegial bodies. 
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Table 3: Ministerial civil servants participating in different working groups and project groups during 
the last year. 1976, 1986, 1996, 2006. Percentage. 
 1976 1986 1996 2006 
Within own ministry 58 71 75 75 
Across ministries 40 53 58 54 
With subordinate bodies and agencies - - 42 40 
N (average) 759 1171 1393 1768 
Second, this is not a new phenomenon. Collegial working groups seem to have existed 
for at least thirty years. These activities increased to a higher level between 1976 and 
1986 and have since remained stable at a high level. Thus, our expectation that these 
kinds of networks and boundary-spanning activities would have increased in recent 
years owing to post-NPM reform initiatives is not supported by these data. It seems to 
be an organizational form and a participation pattern that is rather resilient to reform 
initiatives, whether NPM or post-NPM. This is also quite remarkable since one would 
have thought that increasing complexity of policies would lead to more collegial contact. 
On the other hand, there might also be increasing attention and capacity problems. 
Third, internal groups working across the divisions and units within their own 
ministry along the horizontal dimension are the most common. Two-thirds of the civil 
servants surveyed had participated in such collegial bodies over the last year, but there 
was also a high level of boundary-spanning activities across ministries. More than half of 
the civil servants had participated in such activities, indicating that the strong siloization 
and departmentalization in the central government brought about by specialization by 
task or sector has been partly compensated for by high levels of activity in horizontal 
working groups and project groups crossing ministerial boundaries. There is also a 
rather high level of collegial bodies at the vertical level, bringing together ministerial civil 
servants and their colleagues in subordinate agencies and bodies. 
Exp l a i n i ng  bounda r y - spann i ng  pa r t i c i p a t i on  
The data on the civil servants are nested within the ministries, in the sense that we 
would expect the characteristics of the latter to influence the characteristics of the 
former. Among the many methods of analyzing such data structures, the so-called 
multilevel approach is preferred (Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Hox 2002, Snijders and 
Bosker 2004). Based on this approach, we performed our analysis in three steps. 
First, we started out by estimating «empty» (also called «unconditional» or ‘null) 
models to determine whether, and how much, variation there is between the ministries. 
To do so, we studied the size of the variance components, their significance (in terms of 
Likelihood Ratio tests) and the intra-class correlations (ICCs). We then added 
explanatory variables at both the civil servant and the ministerial level. All the 
independent variables listed in Table 2 were included in the analysis, but to save space, 
the tables only show the significant effects in the final models. In the modelling process 
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we postponed the (collective) testing of educational background to very last. Rather 
than focusing on the particular effects of each educational background we used a 
collective test (the LR-test, once again) to clarify whether such background as a general 
phenomenon affects participation. Significance testing of separate educational groups 
would make little sense, since the result would depend on an arbitrarily selected 
reference group. Four groups (and three dummies) were identified (economists, political 
scientists, lawyers and others, the last being the reference group). 
Note that we tested for random slopes (random coefficient model) to see whether 
the effect of significant individual-level explanatory variables varied between ministries. 
The analysis (not shown) revealed that none of the civil servant explanatory variables 
had significant variance components between the ministries. Slopes are therefore treated 
as fixed in the empirical analysis below. Since observations are few, we decided against 
robust standard errors. 
The first step in the analysis was to see whether the level of participation varied 
significantly across ministries. Table 4 depicts the result in the form of separate (unit-
specific) multi-level logistic regression models for each of the three dependent variables. 
In multi-level logistic regression, the outcome is linear, based on log-odds (the natural 
log of the odds) and includes a random effect for the ministry level. The empty model 
includes no predictors at either level, but provides an overall estimate of the likelihood 
of participation in different project groups between ministries. 
Table 4: multi-level empty logistic regressions: Participation in three types of ministry project groups  
 Internal project group 
participation 
Sub-unit project group 
participation 
Inter-ministry project group 
participation  
Fixed effects    
Coefficient  1.228* -0.404*  0.315* 
Odds Ratio   3.42 0.67 1.37 
Level-2 variance 0.168 0.213 0.243 
Chi-square (p) 19.41* 53.03* 72.58* 
Intra-class correlation 0.049 0.061 0.069 
Plausible value range 
(95%) 
   
Lower 0.60 0.21 0.34 
Mean 0.77 0.40 0.58 
Upper 0.88 0.62 0.78 
N-Level 1 1561 1539 1542 
N-Level 2 18 18 18 
Note: Radom-effects with odds ratios, intra-class correlations, LR-test and plausible value ranges. Table 
entries are full maximum likelihood estimates with non-robust standard errors * Significant at the 0.00 
level.  
As we can see from the first column of Table 4, the predicted logic for having 
participated in internal work groups for a typical ministry is 1.228. The estimated odds 
of such participation is exp (1.191) = 3.42. Thus the estimated probability for 
participation for the respondents is 77 percent (i.e. 3.42/ (1+3.42) * 100 = 77). This 
corresponds well with the overall proportion of civil servants in the survey who 
answered that they actually had participated in internal project groups (75 percent). We 
further estimate that 95 percent of the ministries have a plausible value range for 
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internal project group participation between 59 and 88 percent. Looking at the other 
two dependent variables we see that the estimated variation between ministries is even 
larger. Participation in project groups across ministries is estimated to vary between 35 
and 78 percent. Hence, some ministries have a considerable percentage of respondents 
who did participate in internal project groups, while other ministries do not. 
Furthermore, the results show that we find significant variability around the intercept 
for the ministries on all the three dependent variables (Ministry-level variance for 
internal project group participation is 0.168, for sub-unit project group participation 
0.213 and for cross-ministry project group participation 0.243.) 
The intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) estimates the proportion of variance at 
the department level relative to overall variance (see Snijders and Bosker 1999 for ICC’s 
for dichotomous outcomes). Since the dependent variables are measured at individual 
level (civil servant level) this level should also have the highest ICC score (Steenbergen 
and Jones 2002: 231). Therefore, it comes as a surprise that most of the variation in 
project group participation is to be found at the lower level. Nonetheless, the ministries 
account for between 5 and 6.5 percent of the total variation in the three indicators. For 
participation in internal project groups the ICC is about 5 percent, for inter-ministerial 
project group participation it is 6.5 percent, and for participation in project groups that 
include participants from sub-units it is 6.2 percent. Even if the ICCs are not very high, 
ignoring them would lead to erroneous conclusions, both statistical and empirical. 
Summing up the main findings of Table 4, we can say first, that the main variation in 
the boundary-spanning activity is due to individual-level variables rather than 
organizational-level variables. Second, there is also a significant part of the variation that 
is related to ministerial features which need to be included in the further analyses. Third, 
the importance of organizational level variables is largest for participating in inter-
organizational working groups and project groups that transcend ministerial boundaries 
both horizontally and vertically. 
The subsequent step in the analysis is to include the explanatory variables in the 
model. Since there are only two such variables at Level 2, and in order to save space, we 
present the effects for all the explanatory variables simultaneously. As already 
mentioned, we present only the effects that, after an elaborate testing process, turned 
out to be significant. In the last model we tested for possible educational background 
effects. The entries in the tables are the full maximum likelihood estimates. 
Three results stand out. First, at the civil servant level two explanatory variables turn 
out to be especially important for participation in all three types of project groups: male 
gender and policy development and planning as a main task. We found that male civil 
servants with this main task had a much higher probability than other civil servants of 
participating in project groups. The probability of participating in internal project 
groups was 48 percent (that is exp (0.39) =1.48, (1.48–1.00) * 100=48) higher for male 
civil servants than their female counterparts (among those not having reporting as their 
main task and in the educational group «others»). 
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Table 5: Multi-level regressions: Participation in three types of project groups.  
 Internal project group  Project groups with 
subordinate bodies 
Inter-ministerial project groups 
 Final 
model 
Educational 
background 
effects  
Final 
model 
Educational 
background 
effects  
Final model Educational 
background 
effects 
Fixed Effects       
Constant 0.86* 0.76** -0.76* -0.85* -0.08 -0.26** 
 
Civil-servant 
effects 
      
Structural features:       
Leadership position       
Coordination     0.49** 0.49*** 
Planning and 
development 
0.59** 0.54** 0.66* 0.66* 0.69** 0.70** 
 
Demographic 
features: 
      
Tenure       
Gender 0.39** 0.19*** 0.26** 0.26*** 0.27** 0.18 
Jurists  -0.03  0.16  0.23 
Economists  0.23  0.13  0.14 
Social scientists  0.42  0.11  0.48 
 
Ministry effects 
      
Ministry size     -0.002* -0.002** 
Ministry tenure     0.03** 0.03** 
 
Variance 
Components 
      
Ministry level  0.162* 0.159 0.191 0.201 0.014 0.016 
Deviance compared 
to previous model 
27.96* 8.09** 37.85* 1.43 64.53* 11.863** 
N Civil servant 
level 
1561 1561 1539 1539 1542 1542 
N Ministry level 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Note: Table entries are full maximum likelihood estimates 
* Significant at the .00 level. ** Significant at the .05 level. *** Significant at the .10 level. 
The probability of civil servants with policy development and planning as their main 
task participating in project groups is 80 percent higher than for those with other tasks. 
This group stands out as important participants in all three types of project groups. 
Apart from these two variables all others fail to reach significance for the first two types 
of project group participation. It should come as no surprise that civil servants engaged 
in coordination activities participate more in inter-ministry project groups than other 
civil servants. Coordinators have an odds ratio of 1.63 for participation in inter-ministry 
project groups. This means that there is a 63 percent (that is (1.63–1.00)*100) increase in 
the odds of participating in these groups for coordinators compared to civil servants 
with other job descriptions (where reporting is not their main task). 
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Second, education makes a difference. The results from the analysis of the 
educational background effects are presented in the second column of the table. Here 
we see that such background has a significant effect for internal project group 
participation and for cross-ministry project groups, although not for participation in 
sub-unit project-groups. In the two former groups political scientists appear to be the 
most active participants. 
Third, organizational level makes a difference. The two ministry-related explanatory 
variables in our model – ministry size and institutional/ministry tenure – are important for 
inter-ministry project-group participation, but not for the other two types of 
participation. The number of employees reduces the probability of individual civil 
servants participating in inter-ministry project groups, while institutional experience 
increases the odds of such participation. 
Compared to the empty model, the ministry-level variance components show small 
reductions for internal and sub-unit project-group participation. This is as expected 
given the small degrees of freedom at Level 2. Hence, much of the variance at the 
ministry level is still unaccounted for when it comes to these two types of project group 
participation. However, looking at the ministry-level variance components for inter-
ministry project-group participation shows that the difference between the empty model 
and the model with the two ministry-level explanatory variables is 0.243–0.014=0.229. 
Relative to the size of the variance in the empty model this is a reduction of 
0.229/0.243=0.942. This means that civil-servant and ministry-level variables combined 
explain about 94 percent of the ministry-level variance in inter-ministry project group 
participation. Thus, the model is significant (compared to the empty model) and seems 
to successfully explain variance at the ministry level. 
Ministries do make a difference for participation in different types of work and 
project groups. Male civil servants working in the fields of planning and policy 
development are overrepresented in all three forms of project groups. At the ministry 
level, size and institutional experience seem to be important for inter-ministry project 
group participation. However, when it comes to ministry-based coordination (internal- 
and sub-unit project groups), the two ministry-level variables remain unimportant. The 
analysis also suggests that educational background plays a role for internal- and cross-
ministry project group participation, although not for participation in project groups 
with sub-units. 
Bounda ry - spann i ng  pa r t i c i p a t i on  and  a s se s smen t  
o f  c oo rd i na t i on  
The last of our research questions is whether civil servants engaged in different types of 
boundary-spanning activities have more positive attitudes towards coordination, 
compared with those who are not. Here we use the three variables that were dependent 
variables in the above analysis as independent variables concerning perceived 
coordination or coordination practice. In order to test the argument we use the same 
modelling strategy as in the previous section. The independent variables tested for are 
identical, apart from the fact, as mentioned, that we include the three project group 
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participation indicators2. We do not, however, show the results from the empty models. 
The ICC’s are small and not significant. This means than we can ignore the clustering of 
the data and use standard OLS regression to explore civil servants’ attitudes towards 
coordination. All variables shown in the first column have been included in the first 
tests, but again we only show significant effects. The (collective) test of educational 
background is (as in the previous section) postponed till last. 
The results are presented in Table 6. The second column (final model) shows the 
results after introducing the civil servant explanatory variables. Turning to attitudes 
towards vertical coordination within own ministerial area the analysis reveals that being 
in a leadership position is associated with very positive attitudes, compared with civil 
servants who are not. This reflects formal role obligations and a different perspective on 
coordination compared with executive officers. Coordinators and civil servants who 
have participated in boundary-spanning project groups with sub-units and with other 
ministries also view internal coordination more positively. The coefficients for 
participants in the remaining type – intra-ministerial or boundary-spanning project 
groups – are not significant (not shown). Civil servants with short employment records 
(less than five years) are somewhat less positive compared to those with longer tenure. 
Table 6: Civil servants’ attitudes towards internal- and inter-sectoral coordination. 
 Assessment of vertical coordination within 
own policy area 
Assessment of horizontal 
coordination between different policy 
areas/sectors 
 Final model  Educational 
background 
effects 
Final model Educational background 
effects 
Constant 2.36* 2.42* 2.59* 2.59* 
 
Civil-servant effects 
    
Structural features:     
Leadership position -0.13** -0.12**   
Coordination -0.10*** -0.12**   
Planning and development     
Internal project groups     
Project groups with 
subordinate bodies 
-0.09** -0.09**   
Inter-ministerial project 
groups  
-0.07*** -0.07 -0.12** -0.12** 
 
Demographic features 
    
Tenure 0.09** 0.09** 0.14** 0.10** 
Gender   0.10** 0.13** 
Jurists  -0.12  -0.03 
Economists  -0.10  -0.02 
Political scientists  0.08  0.03 
F-test educational groups  1.76  0.30 
Adjusted R-square 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
N  1346 1344 1207 1205 
Note: OLS regression with unstandardized coefficients. 
* Significant at the .00 level. ** Significant at the .05 level. *** Significant at the .10 level. 
                                                 
2 The three project group participation variables are all positively correlated, but none of them are above .30 (Pearson 
r). 
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When it comes to attitudes towards horizontal coordination between policy areas or 
sectors, fewer independent variables turn out to have significant coefficients. It is 
interesting, however, that those who have participated in inter-ministry project groups 
turn out to be among the most positive civil servants. Participating in the other two 
types of project groups (internal and with sub units) does not yield any significant 
coefficients (again, not shown). 
As for attitudes towards internal coordination, less experienced civil servants also 
regard coordination between sectors and ministries less positively. Male employees are 
even somewhat less positive than civil servants with short employment records in their 
attitudes towards inter-sectoral coordination. Finally, the analysis of the educational 
background effects suggests that we have nothing to learn from including them in the 
analysis. According to the F-tests, educational background does not improve the models 
tested, neither for attitudes towards internal coordination nor for those towards inter-
sectoral coordination. 
Summing up, the main findings here are first, that there is no significant effect of 
organizational level variables. Among individual level variables there is a clear effect of 
structural variables, meaning that participation in project and working groups with 
subordinate bodies does indeed have a positive effect on perceived vertical 
coordination. In addition to participation in such collegial bodies, transcending sectoral 
boundaries tends to enhance a positive perception of horizontal coordination as well as 
vertical coordination. On the other hand, participation in internal ministerial projects 
and working groups does not affect vertical and horizontal coordination in any 
significant way. Position also makes a difference regarding vertical coordination. Civil 
servants in managerial positions tend to have a more positive assessment of this kind of 
coordination. Also civil servants who have coordination as a main task have more 
positive attitudes towards vertical coordination. 
There are also some effects of individual demographic variables. Males and civil 
servants with long tenure tend to assess horizontal coordination more positively. 
Expectations and main results 
Table 7 sums up our main findings regarding the structural and demographic variables 
at the organizational as well as the individual level. We see that structural and 
demographic features are important both at the individual and at the organizational 
level. 
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Table 7: Summing up expectations and results of structural and demographic features at individual 
and organizational level.  
 Individual level Organizational level 
Participation in working and project groups Participation in working and 
project groups 
Leadership position: more participation – no Ministry size: either large or small 
more participation – larger 
ministries less for inter-ministerial 
participation 
Coordination: more participation – yes for 
inter-ministerial 
 
Planning/development: more participation – 
yes overall 
 
Perceived coordination Perceived coordination 
Leadership position: more positive – yes for 
vertical coordination in own sector 
Ministry size: smaller ministries 
more positive – no 
Coordination: more positive – yes for vertical 
coordination in own sector 
 
Planning/development: more positive – no  
Structural 
variables 
More participation: more positive – yes overall 
for inter-ministerial, yes for internal and 
vertical coordination 
 
Participation in working and project groups Participation in working and 
project groups 
Tenure: long gives more participation – no Ministry tenure: long gives more 
participation – yes 
Gender: women less than men , yes  
Jurists less than others – some tendency  
Political scientists more than others – yes for 
internal and inter-ministerial 
 
Economists more than others – some 
tendency 
 
Perceived coordination Perceived coordination 
Tenure: long leads to more positive perception 
– yes overall 
Ministry tenure: long leads to more 
positive perception –- no 
Gender: women less than men – no  
Jurists less than others – no  
Political scientists more than others - no  
Demographic 
variables 
Economists more than others - no  
Going back to our theoretical approaches and the expectations we derived from them, 
we see a pretty varied picture. First, starting with participation in working and project 
groups and the effects of individual structural variables, it is rather surprising that the 
expectation of leaders participating more is not fulfilled. One explanation for this may 
be that there are many groups and they are of varying importance, so only some of them 
may attract leaders. One counter-argument to this would be that inter-ministerial groups 
would, relatively speaking, attract more leaders than other types, which is not the case. 
Another explanation is that administrative leaders increasingly have capacity problems, 
reflected in the finding of the surveys that the contact pattern of leaders has become 
more exclusive, meaning that executive officers are increasingly involved in such 
collegial participation. 
Further we find, mostly as expected, that formal tasks matter, because having 
coordinative or planning/development tasks is connected with more participation. But 
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why should having planning/development tasks have more impact overall than having 
coordinative tasks? One reason may be that planning/development is in reality a 
broader task. 
What about participation and structural organizational variables? Here the 
expectations were rather divided, but the finding was that civil servants from larger 
ministries participate less in inter-ministerial working and project groups. As indicated, 
this may have something to do with small ministries having to engage a relatively higher 
share of civil servants in collegial coordinative efforts, but large ministries may also be 
more specialized concerning boundary-spanning. 
Second, what about demographic variables and participation? Concerning the 
individual variables, we did not find as expected that long tenure results in more 
participation, reflecting that a career factor where civil servants build up a close network 
of contact is of less importance than the type of tasks in which they are engaged. 
According to our expectations, men score higher than women on collegial participation. 
Since leadership position is not connected to participation, this probably does not have 
to do with men being overrepresented in leadership positions, but could be related to 
men overall accounting for a larger share of civil servants than women. Whether this 
also reflects a male-biased network and culture, indicating that men recruit men into 
these bodies, is not easy to find out from these data. Education had an overall effect on 
participation, with political scientists scoring highest, partly as expected. This may reflect 
differences in tasks between educational groups, with political scientists seen as more 
competent at performing boundary-spanning-related tasks, but it may also reflect 
differences in the content of their education. 
Ministerial tenure, an organizational variable, showed, as expected, that ministries 
with an «older» tenure profile engage more in boundary-spanning activities. Since tenure 
as an individual variable did not lead to more participation, the share of civil servants is 
obviously more crucial. Interestingly, this would seem to indicate that a career approach 
is of less value for explaining participation than a generational one. We showed in Table 
3 that boundary-spanning activities were less frequent in the civil service 20–30 years 
ago. 
Third, if we turn to the second part of the analysis and perceptions of coordination, 
we see that our expectations about individual structural variables are mostly fulfilled. 
Even though leaders do not participate more, they have the most positive attitudes 
towards coordination, reflecting their overrepresentation among civil servants with 
coordinative tasks. They also seem to be relatively more preoccupied with internal 
vertical coordination, which may reflect attention and capacity problems. The results for 
tasks seem more difficult to explain. Civil servants with coordinative tasks participate 
more in inter-ministerial boundary-spanning activities, but are most positive towards 
vertical coordination in their own sector. Civil servants with planning/development 
tasks participate overall more but are not overall more positive towards coordination. 
Concerning ministry size, we expected small ministries to be more positive towards 
coordination, but we did not find that. 
Fourth, what about demographic variables and the perception of coordination? 
Concerning tenure, we find the opposite results than for participation. Long individual 
tenure leads to more positive perceptions of coordination, but ministries with a large 
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share of civil servants with long tenure did not yield the same result. Individual tenure 
may reflect more representation in leadership positions, while ministerial tenure may 
reflect a generational factor and «coordination fatigue». Gender shows a different 
pattern than for participation, because women are expected to be more positive towards 
inter-sectoral coordination. If this reflects a gender difference in preferred type of 
interaction, one would eventually have expected to find an overall pattern. We find no 
differentiated pattern concerning higher education, even though political scientists score 
higher for participation. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have shown first that the hierarchical organization of Norwegian 
ministries to a large extent has been supplemented by network-oriented, collegial 
boundary-spanning project and working groups. This phenomenon is not recent but 
goes back at least thirty years and does not seem to be significantly affected by the big 
NPM or post-NPM reform movements. It is most widespread within ministries, but 
more than half of the civil servants surveyed had also participated in inter-ministerial 
collegial bodies over the last year. Bodies spanning the boundary between the ministry 
and subordinate agencies and bodies are also numerous within the central government 
administration. 
Different types of coordination problems have received a renewed focus in the form 
of «whole-of-government» and «joined-up government» programs (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2006, 2007, 2008a) but this paper has also revealed that different kinds of cross-
boundary collegial bodies are definitely an old tool used to enhance coordination in 
central government. Vertically, supplementing hierarchy with collegial working and 
project groups with subordinate bodies is a popular and long-term strategy for political 
executives to regain political control and pursue consistent policies across levels. On the 
horizontal dimension, measures like cross-sectoral bodies, programs or projects have 
been used to a great extent and for a long time to modify the «siloization» or 
«pillarization» of the central public administration with a strong specialization by sector 
(Gregory 2003, Pollitt 2003). 
Second, both individual and organizational features influence the degree of 
participation in such collegial bodies. One of the main contributions of this paper is the 
multi-level analysis which reveals the combined effects of individual and organizational 
features on boundary-spanning activities. The effects of organizational-level features are, 
however, more important for participation in inter-ministerial project groups than in 
internal or vertical sector-specific project groups. They are also more important for 
network participation than for attitudes and assessments of perceived effect on 
coordination. That said, individual features are more important than organizational. 
Especially individual demographic features such as gender seem to be important. Men 
are significantly more involved in such activities than women, which can indicate that 
the network of collegial bodies is male-dominated. But there are also significant effects 
of structural features such as tasks and demographic variables like education. 
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Third, when it comes to attitudes towards coordination there is not much variation 
among the civil servants, in general they turn out to be rather positive towards the two 
types of coordination analyzed in this paper. This being said, participation in project and 
working groups across ministerial level both vertically and horizontally tend to have a 
positive effect on perceived coordination among civil servants. Such networks definitely 
seem to enhance coordination both vertically and horizontally. 
The conclusion is that participation in boundary-spanning activities and its effects on 
perceived coordination cannot only be traced back to either a structural-instrumental or 
to a demographic perspective. There is obviously no one-factor explanation and we 
need to use a mixed-perspective approach to understand these activities and their 
effects. 
One lesson is that if one wants to encourage more collaborative working practices, 
one size does not fit all (Page 2005). Collegial working groups are not a panacea that will 
solve all problems everywhere and at all times. This organizational form is not 
appropriate in all circumstances or suitable for all public-sector activities but can, under 
specific conditions, be a useful supplement to traditional hierarchical organizations and 
thus represents a neo-Weberian feature of modern central government organizations 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). 
There are contradictory structural and demographic forces pulling in different 
directions when it comes to engaging in boundary-spanning activities. On the one hand, 
NPM reforms have pushed central government to decentralize decision-making. On the 
other hand, the centre has been encouraged to strengthen its capacity to coordinate 
policy development and implementation. Several competing strategies have been 
advocated and implemented to enhance coordination, implying that the reform content 
has been fluid and contested. Rather than looking at hierarchy and collegial networks as 
alternative and competing organizational forms, we should understand them as 
supplementing and complementing other organizational modes (Olsen 2009). It is more 
a question of how they co-exist and how they may be traded-off and balanced against 
each other than of replacing one form with another. 
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